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Abstract. Current analysis addresses an apparently critical issue for circulation of wealth in the society. Three actors 
play a game with the welfare-related burden of taxation. The first player, in the role of Negotiator No.1, stands up for 
citizens’ legal and moral rights to social services. The second player, in the role of Negotiator No.2, proceeds from the 
needs of citizens for the provision and delivery of public goods. Quite the opposite, the Player, hereinafter called No.3, 
gives private consumption a preference over social services and public goods, i.e., the citizens-taxpayers hope for a 
reduction in income tax schedules to be deposited in common tax-pool: a shared account of negotiators No.1 and No.2. 
In fact, backed by a threat to reject the negotiators agreement, the player No.3 through political manoeuvring try to  
fulfil expectations of voters-citizens about lower taxes, e.g. a “citizens committee for welfare activity,” or, in short – the 
welfare committee must approve a motion against high taxes by unanimous vote. The government assesses and controls 
the circulation of wealth by poverty line parameter. Through the simulation, we present an evidence for the claim that 
50% median income is close enough to be considered as a realistic choice of poverty line within the scope of terms 
given for Nash bargaining solution and c co on nd di it ti io on ns s   f fo or r   u un na an ni im mo ou us s   v vo ot te e in the committee. 
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Keywords: bargaining, policy, public goods, simulation, taxation, voting  
1. Introduction 
Welfare policy in a democratic State always faces rivalling interests. The paper tries to shed 
lights on the question how a consensus is reached among different interest groups and 
whether this consensus satisfies a criterion of reasonable taxation. These questions are set up 
by a political bargaining with two players, called negotiators, and having different arguments 
about poverty proposals. The third player controls the game and has an objective to find the 
least burden of income tax in the State under investigation. First two players in the role of 
social and public agencies redistribute the wealth what is the classic problem of incomes  
redistribution addressed by a sweet-cake-cutting model. The cutting scheme explicitly intro-
duces a parameter for the bargaining power of negotiators. The size of the cake depends on 
poverty proposals agreed with all parties involved including the third player – the taxpayers. 
We account for the size-effects of the cake by posing a risk for the negotiations to breakdown 
if the poverty proposal of the first player (social agencies) is too generous. 
To clear up any confusion, we call to readers’ attention that the risk of breakdown in our 
scheme originates from political manoeuvring of taxpayers. Furthermore, the public agencies 
may bear guilt of breakdown if they do reject the social agencies proposal. The fact is that 
negotiators may come into the region of too generous proposals where both of them, if   
continuing the bargaining, cannot find any other options at all as “one agent’s welfare   
necessitates a sacrifice” for opponents advantage. “Thus, one would expect the agents to  
negotiate (or haggle) over these candidates – a process that may in turn expend resources 
and delay agreement,” cit. from W. Samuleson [1985: 322]. Therefore, it might be   
questioned whether the taxpayers will ever accept generous proposals. 
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To treat the bargaining power properly, the disagreement point in the bargaining scheme 
has to be extracted endogenously. Unfortunately, a known objection to the Nash scheme 
[1950] is an exogenous point of disagreement given beforehand. In contrast, at least in some 
valuable situations, one can eliminate the necessity of an exogenously given disagreement 
point on condition we later call “an equity of breakdown.” 
Beyond the perception of how to share and negotiate a given amount of wealth, it is also 
reasonable to believe that income distribution is, perhaps, the only target for control and a 
source to assess the policy on poverty. With the regard of income distribution, the reader will 
understand that the T Ta ab bl le e   1 1 is not justified on empirical grounds and that current study does 
not provide the data and empirical support from the field. Even so, an adequate amount of 
wealth simulated across an i in nc co om me e   d di is st tr ri ib bu ut ti io on n   by example, is close enough to be considered 
as a realistic match with an empirical 50% median income policy on poverty found useful by 
Tsumori, Saunders and Hughes [2002], besides by Hunter, Kennedy and Biddle [2002].  
There is no part of the literature for a political game between welfare state institutions that 
directly connects the welfare policy of institutions and the Nash bargaining scheme. Such a 
connection might be interesting since it adds a new spin to both ideas. To discern the root 
cause of the situation and to find solutions for the problems, we try to move in the right  
direction by synthesizing three primary concepts (postulates): 
C Co on ns si is st te en nc cy y:  The long-term prospective of welfare policy is required. 
R Ra at ti io on na al li it ty y:  The need is paramount to strike a mark between incompatible activities   
(demands) for social services and for public goods. 
S Se el lf f- -i in nt te er re es st t:  To bring a motion for a vote is necessary to meet the consumer perception 
against high taxes and excessive public spending. Whether it is good or bad, 
and whether it ought to be acknowledged or not, rejected or accepted, this 
motion must be carried out unanimously by welfare committee. 
Our position refers to the proclaimed postulates that constitute a cascade of three canonical 
principles embedded into the welfare policy of institutions. These principals are nothing else 
than rephrased concepts of the classical economic behaviour aiming at no more than to bring 
on the surface a convenient form assigned to the presentation of the results. 
On m me et th ho od do ol lo og gi ic ca al l   l le ev ve el l, this synthesis is accessible for the observations and could be a 
subject to computer simulations in evaluating wealth redistribution policies. By itself, our 
initiative could also be of certain value for unifying theoretical structure of economic   
analysis of institutions, for passing judgment on social and political organizations, or for  








To make our view clear and leaving apart the debate on what is good or bad and what is 
right or wrong, we composed the following list of key assumptions. 
Assumptions. 
1. We rest on the assumption that the government knows the true incomes of social clients, 
and thus it requires the social administration to bear an appropriate auditing mechanism. 
The government does not know the true incomes of wealthy citizens. 
2. We emphasize in our assumptions that the government controls the circulation of wealth 
from the rich to the poor by poverty line as a parameter and decides whether to   
compensate with subsidies the unfair subsistence of the poor and the needy. However, 
households behavioural pattern remains endogenous: Households demarcate themselves 
as being “rich or poor.” 
3. We assume that whenever the government makes a decision in respect of welfare policy, 
and such a policy emerges from legal and moral rights of citizens, then it has been in  
advance given a chance to be implemented in a long-term horizon. In other words, a  
balance between the debts and credits for social costs is desirable. 
4. The government realizes that its welfare policy may change the behaviour of citizens in a 
way that subsidies eligible for claims may become more attractive for the needy or less 
attractive for the steady clients or visa versa. We assume that inverse working incentives 
feedback (h-factor) effect is likely to happen. In other words, a welfare hazard intro-
duces in the behaviour of households what might “destabilize” the debts to the tax-pool. 
5. We deal a) exclusively with proportional (flat) tax, and assume b) that the government is 
able to enforce tax schedules to be equal to the tax obligations, and c) that the total  
tax-pool accumulated via tax schedules being spent on welfare without savings. 
6. The government can estimate: tax schedules, social and public costs despite the incomes 
of wealthy citizens are hidden or hard to reveal from the observations when the costs are 
to be credited to and tax schedules accumulated (debited) in common tax-pool. 
7. We consider only progressive cost functions depending on the poverty line as a para-
meter. Thus, we anticipate an excessive public spending caused by the degree or extent 
of too generous welfare policies. 
In the n ne ex xt t    s se ec ct ti io on n, we discuss the relevant trends in welfare Policy-Making and issues  
surrounded by three postulates just mentioned above. “The Sweet-Cake-Cutting” in S Se ec ct ti io on n   3 3 
is the part of the game. In S Se ec ct ti io on n   4 4, , we move along the cascade of our welfare policy postu-
lates. At the f fi ir rs st t    s st ta ag ge e, , we disclose the long-term strategy for stabilization of public 
spending. The strategy meets specific feasibility criteria, which is an essential instrument for 
the government to assess and control the circulation of wealth. At the s se ec co on nd d   s st ta ag ge e, we make 








the angle of a bargaining game between social and public agencies. Our work here associates 
the policy on poverty with bargaining related to utility anticipations of negotiators at   
so-called bargaining frontier – the cross boundary into the set of Pareto efficient deals with 
positive utilities. Find the proof of the efficiency criteria in the a ap pp pe en nd di ix x. Only at t th he e   t th hi ir rd d 
stage, the welfare state negotiators, the social and public agencies on both sides of the   
bargaining table might come to an agreement. The agreement might not necessarily be in the 
best self-interest of citizens. However, provided the general conditions for the calculus are 
smooth enough around the local minimum of taxes, we reveal the detail that among solutions 
a specific one would possibly enable a policy on poverty with the least burden of taxation. 
We discuss Self-enforcing (endogenous) solution of the general scheme in S Se ec ct ti io on n    5 5. In   
S Se ec ct ti io on n   6 6, we learn how to simulate the scheme and bring the results to final judgement by 
example. S Se ec ct ti io on n   7 7 ends the study with a summary. 
2. Relevant trends and issues 
Prelude.  In the review on “Handbook of New Institutional Economics,” Ménard and 
Shirley (eds.) [2005], Richter [2005: 387] pointed at “that the sociological analysis…and 
large institutional structures in economic life is still at an early stage…game theory, and 
computer simulation could help to further develop the new institutional approach…game 
theory might be a defendable heuristic device of NIE.” Therefore, we prefer not to examine 
publications, which do not match the subject of our study in detail. To our knowledge (or 
lack of that), the closest to the part of the subject is the public finance. 
The main interest area of public finance lies in the tax policy and public spending. In  
particular, it deals with financing the social security payments to provide a minimum (guar-
anteed) level of welfare for the citizens endowed by weak productivity, assumption N No o. .2 2. 
The materialization of the idea behind the guaranteed welfare is also worth considering on 
the ground of citizens’ legal and moral obligations. Empirical evidence, consistent with legal 
obligations, can be found in the literature of social policy: “...Henderson poverty line. The 
line was initially set (in 1966) equal to the level of the minimum wage plus family benefits for 
one-earner couple with two children,” Saunders [1993: 29]. Hypothesis, consistent with 
moral obligations, can be found in the literature of economic politics: Eichenberger and 








Musgrave [1959] examined two basic approaches to taxation: the “benefit approach,” which 
puts the taxation into efficiency context, and “the ability-to-pay,” which puts the taxation into 
equity context. We intend to augment the reality of welfare policy as we see it with benefit 
approach by guaranteed amount of wealth for a reasonable tax. Furthermore we think that to 
keep taxes fairly levied, the best tax for wealth injects optimal equity into the tax system  
according to ability-to-pay principle of “proportional sacrifice.” 
Consistency. The purchasing, production and delivery of public goods and services give 
rise to public spending. A portion of expenses, often referred in common parlance as welfare 
expenses, reimburses households’, those who have a misfortune, through subsidies. To be 
specific, subsidies for households with low incomes and limited assets provide an adequate 
chance to improve their disposable income. Households eligible for benefits do not have 
many assets, they are not flexible on the labour market, and their income lies under poverty 
line driving them into social exclusion. Therefore, those beneficiaries, who decide to claim 
for benefits, would be better off under the social administration. On the other extreme,   
because of implemented declines in welfare and services, the administration revokes the 
benefits by submitting a request to some steady clients who might find themselves worse off 
and to decide to be flexible once again on the labour market. That is to say, the emphasis on 
welfare implementation may manifest itself in hidden ambiguity as a result of economic 
growth, decline or stagnation, demographic shift, pit or migration, political change, change in 
the scarcity of resources, property rights, in the level of labour force skills and education, 
etc., by sending “insecurity waves” into social services. Now, while the services improve or 
decay, the households, whose disposable income is in the proximity of poverty line, may 
cause a hazard feedback (h-factor) effect on social costs and benefits, which we think may 
have an impact on the tax compliance of all citizens. 
Thus, the first postulate in the Welfare Policy cascade (s se ee e   a ab bo ov ve e) discloses an obvious 
paradigm of public finance: The social agencies have to solve in cooperation with other fiscal 
institutions the long-term horizon problem for stabilization of public spending as it cannot be 








According to ability-to-pay, as how to stabilize inconsistency or distortion of tax polices, 
the known terms of warranty rely on exogenous taxes enforced by the government on the 
productivity of households. A variant of classic public finance and the like, Berliant and 
Gouveia [1994], is the concept when a household of a given productivity does not shift 
his/her labour supply after all the adjustments to tax formula have been implemented:   
Optimal taxation enforces optimal labour supply. Yet another “treatment of policies”   
concerning stabilization, closely related to societal inconsistency, entails equity of pre- and 
post-tax positions of taxpayers. We continue to rely on policy for stabilization to ensure that 
the inconsistency does not happen, assumptions N No o. .3 3   a an nd d   4 4. 
The view to demarcate between households attracts attention among economists and tax 
policy makers: Credit tax-scheme analysis contra income-tested program in “the rich and the 
poor,” two-man economy, Kesselman and Garfinkel [1978], Poverty measurements, Sen 
[1976], Atkinson [1987], Ebert [2002], Hunter et al. [2002]. Horizontal inequalities seem to 
occupy a place in Stewart’s [2000] paper, which reviews the connection linking income   
distribution to economic growth. Peñalosa and Wen [2004] investigate income redistribution, 
which operates as a form of social insurance. Tarp et al. [2002: 8] “The poverty line acts as a 
threshold with households falling below the poverty line considered poor and those above 
poverty line considered nonpoor.”  
Rationality. We argue that it will be difficult to explain how the government, to benefit all 
of the society, assesses and controls the circulation of wealth through the social and public 
agencies unless we end up in long-term horizon on policy stabilization for public spending. 
Nevertheless, provided the policy is feasible, by entering the bargaining stage of the cascade, 
we demonstrate that the government might end up being capable of keeping together incom-
patible demands for social services and for public goods. 
“These flimsy structures, however, are used by individuals to allocate resource flows to 
participants according to rules that have been devised in tough constitutional and collective-
choice bargaining situations over time,” Ostrom [2005: 823]. Therefore, by Kalai’s [1977a] 
asymmetric variant of Nash [1950] bargaining solution, we reveal the division of taxpayers’ 
obligations between social agencies, pursuing their own causes on one side, and public agen-
cies on the other. Nonetheless, it might appear that we also be committed to reasoned belief 








Yes, it is realistic to imagine that our actors of social and public agencies play the   
“bargaining drama” of alternating offers between themselves and simultaneously with   
citizens until all parties reach an agreement. Even though, we do not tell by which bargaining 
procedure the negotiators actually do arrive at an outcome, but demonstrate the calculus of 
Nash solution. The procedure of bargaining, whether it is under complete or incomplete   
information, is secondary for us. Nonetheless, whether the utilities are interpersonally   
comparable, or the procedure is under the hypothesis of collective rationality or not, makes a 
difference later. The literature dealing with these serious matters of bargaining occupy a wide 
range of publications, Alvin E. Roth [1985]. 
Self-interest. Finally, only at the t th hi ir rd d   s st ta ag ge e the well-being of citizens has been taken into 
consideration. Only at this stage, the government will move to meet the momentum of   
citizens by focusing on reasonable demands for welfare provision and delivery, to improve 
the perception and behaviour of consumers against high taxes. Otherwise, destabilized tax 
schedules or disagreeing social and public agencies at previous stages could block the further 
turn of the government in making favourable policy for citizens. Therefore, we have to   
accept that “…as a result of the intervention of a third party, who exploits the mutual 
gains…if we perturb a bargaining game of alternating offers by introducing a small exoge-
nous probability of breakdown then…the outcome is close to Nash solution of the 
appropriately defined bargaining problem,” Osborn and Rubinstein [1990: 71-76]. To put it 
other way, the threat, in the terms of a disagreement to implement the breakdown, is an  
ultimate argument in the debate to achieve the goal of taxpayers (citizens). 
Finally, we must emphasize that we do not analyse any voting system or scheme by which 
voters-citizens express their argument as taxpayers. Rather than, a voting tool of collecting 
data about who would approve or oppose as to what proposal is best, we design a debating 
and voting platform for the government policy on poverty, T Ta ab bl le e   1 1. As noticed by Roberts 
[1977: 329], “The point is not whether choices in the public domain are made through a  
voting mechanism but whether choice procedures mirror some voting mechanism,” and as 
such, we adhere to all voting guidelines where each tax proposal comes with or includes its 
own tax, c.f. Mueller [2003: 67]. Worth to know that without a goal of minimizing taxes, the 
policies, what the government will be dedicated to overturn, will not be necessarily approved 
by unanimous vote, O Ob bs se er rv va at ti io on n   3 3, c.f. Buchanan [1967: 4.1.4] reasoning of “Public choices 








3. The cake model 
Someone thinking about standards how humans make decisions may ask: What a cut it is to 
divide a piece of cake fairly between two persons: HE – soft negotiator, not very keen on 
sweets, SHE – tough negotiator, likes sweets. Axiomatic bargaining theory solves the Sweet-
Cake-Cutting problem by product maximization of players’ gains above the disagreement 
point  () 2 1 d , d d = , the asymmetric variant, Kalai [1977a]: 
  () ( )
α α α
−
≤ + ≤ − ⋅ − =
1
2 1
   
1   y   x   0     d ) y ( g d ) x ( u ) , y , x ( f max   arg . 
Although the answer may probably be obvious to many game theory purists a question  
often asked is: What is x ,  y, α ,  ) x ( u  and  ) y ( g ? What is the point () 2 1 d , d  and how to 
use the  max arg  procedure? The answer may be: 
x   is HIS cutting the cake, and α  – HIS bargaining power,  1 0 ≤ ≤ x ,  1 0 ≤ ≤ α . 
) x ( u   is HIS desire, for example  x ) x ( u ≡ , of HIS x  cutting the cake, 
α − 1   is HER bargaining power, 
) y ( g  is HER desire of HER  y cutting the cake, for example y ) y ( g ≡ ,  1 0 ≤ ≤ y . 
In widely accepted vocabulary, we call  () ) y ( g ), x ( u s =  the utility pair. The disagreement 
point  () 2 1 d , d d =  is what HE and SHE collect if they disagree how to cut the cake. The 
sweet cake disagreement point  () ( ) 0 0 2 1   , d , d d = = ; disagreeing players collect nothing for 
clear reason. Further, we indicate that expectations from the cake are more valuable for HER 
pointing at HER desire  707 0. ½ (½) g = = , which is greater than HIS desire  5 0. (½) u = . 
Now, considering the  max arg  procedure of  ) , y , x ( f α  one may ask a new question: 
“What standards HE, the sweet cake negotiator, will make HIS decision on to obtain the half 
of the cake?” That is to ask, for example, what standards facilitate HIS negotiating power α  
to obtain the half of the cake if SHE may only accept or reject the proposal? A technically 
minded person can shed lights on the solution. First replace  ) x ( u  by x , put  x y − = 1 ,  
replace  ) y ( g  by  x − 1  and take the derivative of the result  ) , x , x ( f α − 1  with respect to 
the variable x by evaluating  ) , x , x ( fx α − ′ 1   . Then, replace  ½ x = , and finally solve the  








In general, one might feel some comfort in following passage. “Even in the face of the fact 
that SHE is twice as tough negotiator, 
1 1 to count on the half of the cake is a realistic attitude 
towards HIS position of negotiations. Surely, rather sooner than later, since HE revealed 
that SHE likes sweets, HE would have HER to agree to a concession.” This is an example of 
what ought to be the standard behaviour of a negotiator. 
4. The tax-pool model 
Consistency. Tax-pool stabilization. When trying to meet incompatible demands for the 
provision and delivery of social services and public goods, a subject turns out to divide the 
pool of taxes. Is there a resemblance with the Sweet-Cake-Cutting problem? To follow the 
same pattern of “cutting the cake-pool of taxes” seems, more or less, reasonable. Indeed, the 
subsidies on one side, and the public safety, environment protection, education and health 
services, national defence, roads and highway systems, etc., as public goods on the other 
side, all together demand to redistribute the wealth. Nevertheless, a difficulty could make the 
difference because the size of the pool might influence the fair bargain. Note: When HE and 
SHE tried to cut the cake, its size remained fixed! Is it true that the size of the pool if varying 
too fast might confuse the negotiators in making their decisions? 
On what standards should the State make its policy more relevant towards this matter? One 
might suggest first looking at incomes of households to personalize the social, public and 
consumer needs of people. Thus, the situation looks more like a game between the social 
agencies negotiating their portion of the tax-pool with public agencies, and the taxpayers  
refunding the same pool. As mentioned above, this is not enough, because the size of the 
pool could vary too fast and thereby break into the behaviour of our rational negotiators. 
Surely, welfare costs could smooth out the balance of the tax-pool payments. Therefore, as 
long as the government does not stabilize the pool, the fair agreement between social and 
public agencies is at risk; we say not feasible or inconsistent. What policy might be feasible 
if the government wishes to be in position to meet the legal and moral rights of the poor? 
                                                           








Let us first consider a policy on poverty without any warranty of consistency from the  
government. The policy might be set by the poverty line ξ  to decide who is living in   
poverty, and to transfer the wealth from the rich to the poor: poor people’s income σ  is to 
the left from the line ξ ,  ξ σ ≤ < 0 ; rich people with income σ  are to the right,  ∞ < < σ ξ . 
Now, according to the assumption N No o. .2 2, the government is ready to transfer the wealth W  
from the rich  ξ σ >  to the poor  ξ σ ≤ . In considering assumption N No o. .6 6 and based on its 
perception of income distribution density  ) ( P σ , the government estimates the tax schedules 
in the form of  W ⋅ τ , the costs of subsidies as B, and public costs as g . The government is 
ready to finance the social services – to refund the costs B via the tax schedules  W ⋅ τ . It is 
ready to keep the balance of payments between the credits B and debts  W x ⋅ ⋅ τ  as a portion 
of schedules  W ⋅ τ . Should the government shift the costs B to  ) ( B ξ , and  W ⋅ τ  to 
) ( W ξ τ ⋅ , it would open the way to meet its readiness to keep the balance 
) ( W x ) ( B ξ τ ξ ⋅ ⋅ = . 
In our vocabulary, an implemented or taken effect policy ξ , poverty line ξ , social policy, 
welfare reform, pact, program, etc. will specify the balance  ) ( W x ) ( B ξ τ ξ ⋅ ⋅ = . Despite the 
balance is valid, it might break in the time slots ahead of the beginning – policy ξ  bids fair 
as being unstable in a long-term horizon. As far as balance of wealth is desirable, only few 
would question the assumption N No o. .3 3. However, almost all, perhaps for different reasons, 
would prefer the balanced way to implement a long-term policy. This was but the first fold of 
the truth. The second embodies the welfare hazard, assumption N No o. .4 4, as follows. 
In fulfilling the policy ξ  on poverty, by implementing rises in disposable income level u, 
all in need, who claimed for benefits, end up better off. A different outcome in level u would 
worse off some steady clients should their benefits being revoked. So, the level u  tidal 
waves may introduce in the behaviour of those whose claims will be accepted or those who 








and to shift it into undisclosed position  ) , ( P ξ σ . Accordingly, the policy ξ  will shift the 
balance  ) ( W x ) ( B ξ τ ξ ⋅ ⋅ =  into the long-term inconsistency  ) ( W x ) ( B f f ξ τ ξ ⋅ ⋅ ≠ . 
An issue that justifies the shift involves quantification. We take into account income scale 
over functions  ) , ( P ξ σ . Hence, the scale admits only linear transformations  σ σ ⋅ = c ' , 
0 > c  in establishing a ratio scale for all variables and functions. Actually, this scale satisfies 
a form of interpersonal comparability of utilities, c.f. Narens and Luce [1983: 249]. 
One will say that the economy must be immune against swings of poverty in a long-term 
horizon according to C Co on ns si is st te en nc cy y   P Po os st tu ul la at te e. That is to say, the immune policy ξ  previously 
taken effect does not need further adjustments. Likewise, to say that implementing a policy 
ξ  under the “immune” or “navigable environment” is all one as to say that the government, 
to ensure a proper result, implements the policy only once. For this reason, we assume that 
inconsistency of wealth is resolved – constraint ( (3 3) ) resolves for ξ , i.e. the feedback   
inconsistency  ) ( W x ) ( B f f ξ τ ξ ⋅ ⋅ ≠  has been eliminated:  ) ( B ) ( B f ξ ξ = , and 
) ( W ) ( W f ξ ξ = . Briefly, the initial tidal wave replication stabilizes after the implementation 
of the push or pull on the policy ξ . 
In this mode, the government is developing its policy ξ  that outlines the long-term strategy 
for stabilization of public spending by which the policy might be brought to conclusion. We 
therefore conclude that the account of expenses  ) ( W x ξ τ ⋅ ⋅  meant for social spending, 
where  x is the division of the tax-pool  ) ( W ξ τ ⋅ , must be in balance with social costs 
) ( B ξ  not only when the particular policy ξ  takes effect but also in the whole spectrum of 
current and future events: the government policy ξ  should enforce the long-term stability. 
The balance  ) ( W x ) ( B ξ τ ξ ⋅ ⋅ =  is a relationship leading to functional dependency 
) x , (ξ τ  binding ξ  and x variables. The dependency τ  suggests, that through formula 
() ( ) φ φ σ τ τ σ π + − ⋅ − = 1 ) , ( , c.f. Malcomson [1986: 266], the function  )) x , ( , ( ξ τ σ π  is 








At last, this leads to an obvious question as to by which composition of social costs  ) ( B ξ  
and tax obligations  ) ( W ξ τ ⋅  these functions emerge as a realistic estimates of responses to 
the government policy ξ  on poverty. Using an empirical data seems to be the best option. 
Yet, another technical endeavour could be to allow easy computations by classical method of 
function maximization (minimization) with constraints. In short, the welfare composition 
[] ) ( W ), ( B ξ ξ    is the origin of wealth in current investigation. 
Summary. An outcome  τ α ξ φ , g , u , , x , p , ⇒  constitutes citizens bargaining shield for 
wealth circulation that relates to a bundle of variables: policy (or control) parameters  ξ φ , ; 
the status is set to  α , x , p   ;    τ, g , u  embodies the competing arguments (proposals); 
φ  –  the personal allowance establishing the tax bracket [ ) ∞ , φ , 
it is an ex-ante, the control parameter,  ξ φ < = < const 0 ; 
ξ  –  the poverty line, a policy to decide who is living in poverty,  
the choice or the control parameter as well; 
p  – the pool  W p ⋅ = τ  of tax obligations (public spending)  
in case of proportional taxes, the assumption N No o. .5 5, p. a); 
x –  the division of the tax-pool  p to be deposited in favour of  
social agencies,  1 0 ≤ ≤ x ; 
α  –  a negotiating power of social agencies,  1 0 ≤ ≤ α ; 
u –  the guaranteed welfare or disposable income level, demands for social services; 
g  –  demands for public goods, public costs; 
τ  –  the marginal tax rate, the wealth-tax. 
Three constraints must hold: 
–  delivery constraint, all taxes are spent on welfare (social + 
public); welfare delivery equals to liabilities of taxpayers’,  
b) and c) of assumption N No o. .5 5; this concept of wealth 
makes sense for proportional, i.e. for flat taxes only, p. a) 
of assumption No.5. 
g ) ( B ) ( W + = ⋅ ξ ξ τ  (1) 
–  balance of social costs with the portion of the tax-pool  
(portion of taxpayers’ obligations) credited to, and  
deposited (debited) in social agencies’ account,  
assumption N No o. .3 3;  ) ( B ξ is the social costs mean value 
shifted by the government policy ξ , 
) ( W x ) ( B ξ τ ξ ⋅ ⋅ =  (2) 
–  necessary constraint to remove the effect of welfare  
hazard, assumption N No o. .4 4, (we distinguish the utility levels 
) , ( u τ ξ π =  as an indifference curve ()
2 ℜ ⊂ ℜ ∈ τ ξ ,  in 
contrast to ()
2 ℜ ∈ τ σ , !) 








•  Division  x and marginal tax rate τ , due to the constraints ( (1 1- -3 3) ), became functions of 
variables  g , ξ :  ) g , ( x x ξ =  and  )) g , ( x , ( ξ ξ τ τ = . This form of dependencies appears 
later at the stage of wealth-tax minimization. 
•  The explicit formulas, for the total costs B of subsidies and the amount W  of the wealth, 
are generally given by parameterised income distribution  ) h , ( P ξ θ σ ⋅ + : 
  σ ξ θ σ σ ξ ξ
ξ
d ) h , ( P ) , ( s ) ( B ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ = ∫
0
,  ) , ( s σ ξ  is the subsidies function; 
  () ( ) σ ξ θ σ φ σ σ ξ θ σ φ σ ξ σ ξ
ξ
ξ




where h-factor reveals the inverse working incentives feedback of social clients. 
•  The policy ξ  is an issue shaping the purchasing of wealth W  at the provision side of ser-
vices and goods. It is an issue of average income  ) h ( a ξ θ ⋅ +  maintenance to uphold the 
restraint  ) ( W ) h ( a ξ ξ θ > ⋅ +  by proper choice of personal allowance parameter  0 > φ . 
•  The baseline  ) , ( P θ σ  of the income density function is the initial position, when the  
circulation of wealth from the rich to the poor just starts, i.e.,  ) , ( P θ σ  embodies the  
assumption N No o. .6 6. The feedback factor  0 < h  leads to the assumption N No o. .4 4 hiding the tidal 
wave  0 < ⋅ +
∂
∂
= ) h ( a ) ( Hz ξ θ
ξ
ξ  of the welfare hazard triggered by the push  ξ ∆ ξ +  
or pull  ξ ∆ ξ −  on the policy ξ . Factor  0 < h  brings  ) , ( P θ σ  into undisclosed position 
() ) h , ( P ξ ∆ ξ θ σ ± ⋅ + . 
Following justifies the welfare hazard constraint ( (3 3) ) in more rigorous vocabulary. 
Observation 1. Constraint  ) , ( u τ ξ π =  is necessary to remove the welfare hazard effect. 
All proofs are in the a ap pp pe en nd di ix x. 
Corollary. If  )) x , ( , ( u ξ τ ξ π =  resolves for ξ , excluding the chance for households σ  to 
misbalance  ) ( W x ) ( B ξ τ ξ ⋅ ⋅ =  and, hereby, without additional adjustments  ' ξ ,  " ξ  to   
remove the effect of welfare hazard, then the long-term policy ξ  is feasible. 
Finally, replacing the expression of the constraint ( (2 2) ) via τ  into (3), the welfare hazard 
constraint  )) x , ( , ( u ξ τ ξ π =  must resolve for feasible policy ξ  in the form: 
  () () 0 = ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ − = ) ( W u x ) ( B ) u , x , ( L ξ ξ ξ φ ξ ξ : . (4) 
We call (4) the volatility constraint that introduces in rigorous form the consistency postu-








A notice is appropriate. We already know that social costs  ) ( B ξ  and the amount  ) ( W ξ  of 
wealth are the keys to the welfare composition in our two-man economy. In addition, we 
stress that ±  rates  0 ≤ ) ( ' W ξ ,  0 ≥ ) ( ' W ξ  of changes for amounts  ) ( W ξ , are essential for 
the analysis. However, we use the function  ) ( B ξ  only with  0 > ) ( ' B ξ , assumption N No o. .7 7. 
Rationality. Tax-pool bargaining. Let, in accordance with the s se ec co on nd d   p po os st tu ul la at te e of Welfare 
Policy, both the rich and the poor pay their taxes τ , and let, by calculating the costs  ) ( B ξ  
and amounts o of f   wealth    ) ( W ξ , the government estimates for the policy ξ . How the social 
and public agencies are going to bargain on the division of the tax-pool? 
We first personalize the following arguments of all parties involved: 
Arguments of the Negotiators No. 1, 2 and the Player No.3: 
Negotiator No.1   u  –  welfare level, the legal and moral argument (the lowest dispos-
able net income per capita, guaranteed level of poverty to be 
implemented by the government in compliance with the law; 
Negotiator No.2   g   –  public goods per capita, argument that benefits all of the society; 
Player No.3  ) (ξ τ   –  estimated wealth-tax, the less the better. We consider only  
proportional taxes, so-called flat taxes – the case, which  
substantially simplifies the method of function maximization 
(minimization) with constraint, p. a) of the assumption N No o. .5 5. 
Note: When the size of the pool varies too fast 
2 2, a feasible outcome of the game could be at 
risk unless the volatility constraint  0 = ) u , x , ( L ξ , O Ob bs se er rv va at ti io on n   1 1. 
Before advancing any further, let recollect the phenomenon of bargaining problem. Assume 
that negotiators bargain over possible division () y , x  of the tax-pool  ) ( W ξ τ ⋅ ,  1 ≤ + y x . 
Below we follow Nash’s [1950] axiomatic approach. An arbitrary set S  of utility pairs 
() 2 1 s , s s = ,  u s = 1 ,  g s = 2  evaluated only for feasible policies ξ  (policies immune against 
welfare volatility) can be the outcome of the game. A disagreement occurs at the utility point 
() 2 1 d , d d = , where both negotiators  2 1, i =  obtain the lowest welfare they count on. The 
bargaining problem is a pair  d , S  and there exists  S ∈ s  such that  i i d s >  for  2 1, i =  and 
S ∈ d . A bargaining solution is a function  ) d , ( f S  that assigns a unique element of S  to 
                                                           
2 2  Be aware that the process  ,... ,ξ ξ ′′ ′  for stabilization of the tax-pool has a limit  ,... , lim ξ ξ ξ ′′ ′ =   , 
whereby the level  ) ( u u ξ =  and public goods  ) ( g g ξ =  as functions turn into “stable” limits as well. 








every bargaining problem  d , S . We expect that the negotiators to be committed to the  
bargaining solution  f , which satisfies SIR – the strong individual rationality hypothesis: 
0 > ) d , ( f S  for every bargaining problem  d , S . The solution must comply with other 
Nash axioms: Invariance under linear change of scale of utilities, Independence of irrelevant 
alternatives, and Pareto efficiency. Following efficiency, negotiators never agree on ξ  in  
favour for ξ ′  if  s ) ( s ′ = ′ ξ  and  s s > ′ ,  ) ( s s ξ = . It means that pragmatic negotiators object 
an outcome s when a better (more efficient) outcome  ' s  for both of them is feasible. 
As already mentioned, the poverty line or policy ξ  on poverty is the control or choice  
parameter of the government. Throughout the paper, we refer to the policy ξ  as to poverty 
proposal, when the bargaining agreement over the division of the tax-pool is under negotia-
tions. Therefore, to place a proposal ξ  to reveal the constraint that mediates consumers 
perception against high taxes, which would thus enable the least wealth-tax, seems to offer an 
appealing interpretation to the otherwise puzzling welfare anticipation  () g , u ) ( s = ξ . 
Comment is in place to clarify a standpoint of confusion. Classical definition of bargaining 
problem consists of a compact convex set 
2 ℜ ⊂ S  and the disagreement point  S ∈ d .  
Conventionally, the bargaining occurs on contract curve  b S . In our case, we call this curve a 
bargaining frontier. A typical frontier  ) g ( u = b S  on F Fi ig g. .   2 2 represents proposals ξ , which 
solve every single  [] 2 1 ξ ξ ξ ,   ∈  for the volatility constraint ( (4 4) ) and in the same way for   
efficiency constraint ( (6 6) ). In this respect, we read from Osborn and Rubinstein [1982: 24] that: 
“The compactness and the convexity of S  are important only insofar as they ensure that the 
Pareto frontier of  S  is well defined and concave. Rather than starting with the set  S , we 
could have imposed our axioms on a problem defined by a non-increasing concave function 
(and a disagreement point d ).“ 
It looks like our environment for bargaining frontier  ) g ( u = b S  expands beyond the   
traditional framework of Osborn and Rubinstein. The thing is that negotiators may cross or 
penetrate through the bargaining frontier as a boundary into prohibitive region – a region of 
too generous poverty proposals ξ . Would the negotiators, nevertheless, be willing to   
continue bargaining but without commitment to cross the frontier  b S , then an inefficient 








this bargain, O Ob bs se er rv va at ti io on n    6 6. However, within the normal range of poverty to examine   
pragmatic interaction of negotiators might be an advantage. In short, passing along the   
normal range of poverty the bargaining frontier  b S  arranges an ultimate barrier if the   
negotiators drive to it improving their payoffs in cooperation. That was the reason why we 
called the cross passage by a bargaining frontier. 
One, perhaps, may recognize here the vocabulary of Laffer curve but for different domain, 
similar to: First “…poverty lines being proposed in the normal range of collective rational-
ity;” Next, “…by passing through their last bifurcation” poverty proposals will be assessed 
and reviewed in the range of prohibited (individual) rationality. We exploit here normal, 
prohibited vocabulary of Canto, Joins and Laffer [1981: 12], as well as we paraphrase from 
Rapoport [1994: 31]: “Bifurcation of the concept of rationality into ‘individual’ and ‘collec-
tive’ rationality, which prescribe different courses of action to a ‘rational’ actor.” 
A closer look at what we later will call “a breakdown manoeuvring of negotiators” seems 
to be instructive. In the normal range any utility anticipation  () 2 1 d g , d u ) ( s = = = ξ   
of poverty suits well as breakdown or disagreement point. To sharpen the meaning, we will 
interpret the point d  as well as the risk it poses not to comply with realistic standards of  
social services and public goods. It is not immediately apparent when a disagreement point 
d  is a feasible outcome of the game. Following observation rules out such a doubt. 
Observation 2. To testify that the utility point  () 2 1 d , d d =  becomes a feasible outcome of 
the bargaining game, it is necessary and sufficient that there exists a policy δ on poverty 
resolving the equation: 
  () ( ) ( ) 0 1 2 = ⋅ − − + ⋅ − ) ( W d d ) ( B δ δ δ φ δ . (5) 
Recall that  ) ( W δ  is the amount of wealth circulating in the society,  ) ( B δ  – social costs. 
Corollary. Suppose that there exists a policy δ resolving the equation (5) for the utility 
pair  () b S ∉ = 2 1 g , u d , i.e., for the pair composed of the endpoints () 1 1 g , u  and () 2 2 g , u  in 
the bargaining interval [] 2 1 ξ ξ ,   ,  2 1 g g > ,  2 1 u u < ; condition  [] 2 1 ξ ξ δ ,   ∉  is necessarily   
required. Then, for any utility pair  b S ∈ s  we have  d s > , and for the bargaining frontier 








Since the volatility constraint  0 = ) u , x , ( L ξ  resolves for poverty proposal ξ , see ( (4 4) ), the 
outcome    τ α ξ φ , g , u , , x , p , ⇒  do not allow too fast variation of the tax-pool  W p ⋅ = τ  
in size. Even so, a different aspect of the bargaining frontier is the efficiency constraint on  
utility pairs () g , u . We stress it again that bargaining frontier  b S  is a boundary at which the 
motivation of negotiators changes. Negotiators arrived at the frontier guided by collective 
rationality, but they have an option, in view of individual interests and without commitment, 
to continue bargaining by crossing into prohibitive range of inappropriately high values of 
poverty. One thing perhaps is worth. Outcomes in the prohibited range result de facto in 
“status quo situations,” Kalai [1977b: 1623]. That's why, the frontier  b S  is “the last 
chance” for society to fulfil its mission with appropriate level of subsidies provided for the 
poor what is fully coherent with the difference principle of justice, Rawls [1971: 303].  
Summary. An outcome    τ α ξ φ , g , u , , x , p , ⇒  on the bargaining frontier  b S  must satisfy 
the efficiency constraint 
  () () [] 0 = ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ −
∂
∂
= ) ( W u x ) ( B ) u , x , ( D ξ ξ ξ φ ξ
ξ
ξ : . (6) 
If someone doubts the solution (6) of the bargaining problem  d , b S  constrained by 
0 = ) u , x , ( D ξ , we reproduced the necessary and sufficient conditions for criteria (6) in the 
appendix, O Ob bs se er rv va at ti io on n   5 5. 
Self-interest. Wealth-tax minimization. Those who need to make decisions know the 
minimization/maximization problems under constraints. 
The marginal tax, i.e. the wealth-tax minimization, is the consumer (M)-problem: 
(M)  )) g , ( x , ( g , ξ ξ τ τ ξ ≡     min , 
  where the tax parameter is a function of ξ  and x,  ) g , ( x x ξ =  is the division 
of the tax-pool (taxpayers obligations); 
and the bargaining is (N)-problem  
(N)  () ()
α α − − ⋅ − =
1
2 1
   
    d g d u ) g , u ( f g , u max  for some unknown α . 
Both (M) and (N) are subject to constraints: 
0 = ) g , , ( Q τ ξ  –  d de el li iv ve er ry y; 
0 = ) u , x , ( L ξ  –  v vo ol la at ti il li it ty y; 







as preconditions for the 
political game between 








Particularly, in case of proportional (flat) taxes, constraints Q ,  L and D , following a suc-
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ξ τ = ,  ) ( g ) ( B ) ( p ξ ξ ξ + = ,  0 > ) ( ' B ξ . 
Hereby, the welfare level  ) ( u ξ  and public goods  ) ( g ξ  depend only on poverty proposals 
(policies)  ξ  of the government. Thus, the minimization of consumer (M) as well as the  
bargaining problem (N), turn to be without constraints: 
(M) 
) ( W






=     min , 
(N)  () ()
α α
ξ ξ ξ α ξ
− − ⋅ − =
1
2 1
      d ) ( g d ) ( u ) , ( f max . 
Observation 3.  Condition  ) (ξ τ λ ξ      min   arg =  is necessary to put forward a poverty   
proposal λ  before the welfare committee by unanimous vote. At the bargaining frontier  b S , 
the proposal λ  outlines a unique outcome    b S ∈ ⇒ ) ( ), ( g ), ( u , , x , p , λ τ λ λ α ξ φ . 
At last, we arrived at the idea of resemblance between: the sweet cake Policy-Making, when 
two highly pragmatic persons try to cut a sweet cake, and the welfare Policy-Making, when 
the social and public agencies try to divide the tax-pool. Provided  ) (ξ τ  is smooth enough, 
we experienced above that the solution of consumer problem (M) is the root λ  of the   
equation  0 = ) ( ' ξ τ . We also experienced that, to avoid the breakdown, associated with   
political manoeuvring of taxpayers, the policy λ  is the most desirable for the government. 
But, how to serve the Sweet-Cake-Cutting as a portion of suitable tax package in a way that 
impacts the power α  of the social agencies to meet the finance of welfare level  ) ( u λ ? 
To put a new spin on old idea appears to be clear. Indeed, the standards affecting HIS  
negotiating power α  of the Cake-Cutting can be the standards for the social agencies to  
affect their negotiating power α . Recall that first, we must take the derivative of  ) , ( f α ξ  
with respect to ξ  evaluating  ) , ( f α ξ ξ   ′ , and then we must replace ξ  by λ  (do not replace 
½ = ξ  this time like in the case of sweet cake). At last, the negotiating power α  of the social 








5. Self-enforcing solution 
Let sidestep the analysis by focusing first on some shortcomings. It seems we passed by all 
the troubles with the disagreement poverty proposal δ. Nevertheless, imagine a situation 
when, in the search for funds financing initial anticipations () 1 1 g , u  and () 2 2 g , u  of negotia-
tors, the difference in amounts of wealth and taxes could in the beginning contribute to or 
amplify misunderstandings of the rules in the political game. Below, we not only take care of 
how to avoid the difference, we are also working on an extra option how to extract the break-
down point  () () 2 1 2 1 g , u d , d d = =  endogenously encoded into the scheme. 
The frontier  ) g ( u = b S  looks like a curve () ) ( g ), ( u ξ ξ , parameterised by proposals ξ  
within the scope of negotiations  [] 2 1 ξ ξ ξ < ∈   ,  ) ( u u 1 1 ξ = ,  ) ( g g 1 1 ξ = ,  ) ( u u 2 2 ξ = , 
) ( g g 2 2 ξ = ,  2 1 u u < ,  2 1 g g > , c co or ro ol ll la ar ry y to the Observation 2, F Fi ig g. .   2 2. Social agencies make 
a proposal ξ  to the agreement () b S ∈ ) ( g ), ( u ξ ξ  what the public agencies can only accept 
or reject. The risk of policy ξ  breakdown emerges when the committee decides, on behalf of 
voters, to implement the worst-case scenario () 2 1 g , u , or, the public agencies decide against 
the proposal ξ . As it follows from O Ob bs se er rv va at ti io on n   2 2, the worst-case proposal but feasible δ, if 
the equation ( (5 5) ) can be resolved, accumulates, as well, the endpoints of the interval [] 2 1 ξ ξ ,   . 
In the following lines of reasoning, we label the situation as an equity condition of break-
down associated with political manoeuvring of taxpayers. Indeed, we already know that the 
implementation of utility anticipations, i.e. the demands  () 1 1 1 g , u s =  and  () 2 2 2 g , u s =  at the 
ends of interval [] 2 1 ξ ξ ,   , would require some amounts of wealth  ) ( W 1 ξ  and  ) ( W 2 ξ  for 
taxes  ) ( 1 ξ τ  and  ) ( 2 ξ τ . The demands  1 s ,  2 s  of negotiators being the “initial amounts of 
wealth and taxes” are, in mundane terms, the alleged resources for maintenance of social  
services and public goods. Therefore, to bring negotiators into just and equal positions prior 
to negotiations, it is reasonable, if possible, to equalize their legal claims for finance of  
welfare implementation. Thus, the exercise would be to fix an interval [] 2 1 ξ ξ ,    solving a  
system of two non-linear equations  ) ( W ) ( W 2 1 ξ ξ =  and  ) ( ) ( 2 1 ξ τ ξ τ =  for two variables 
1 ξ  and  2 ξ , i.e. to find a point ()
* *, W τ  where the bargaining frontier crosses its own contour 
on the plain with  τ, W  as XY-axis coordinates like on F Fi ig g. .   3 3. Not a hard exercise to quantify 








6. The method 
Recommendations. We will now go back from the way we sidestepped the bargaining  
frontier analysis and continue along the guidelines of the general scheme. Eventually, as far 
as incomes survey analysis is required, additional efforts to estimate or restore the income 
distribution  ) ( P σ  from atomic data will be necessary. There are methods, for example,  
Feser et al. [1994], to cope with this problem. 
We recommend performing the analysis by simulation in steps. 
1. Parameterisation of  ) ( P σ  by θ  in the form  ) , ( P θ σ . Parameter θ  must keep to the 
primary shape of the distribution  ) ( P σ , but crash it to the right when θ  increases and 
protrude to the left when decreasing. In the example, we also use a parameter m to make 
the distribution more equal/flat when m increases and more unequal/peaked when m  
decreasing. The equal/unequal parameterisation of the primary  ) ( P σ  is not mandatory.  
2. Here, assumption N No o. .4 4, the h-factor inserts the adverse working incentives of households. 
Replace the parameter θ  by  ξ θ ⋅ + h , where ξ  represents the policy on poverty and 
choose  0 < h . In so doing, the average income  ) h ( a ξ θ ⋅ +  as an indicator on the provi-
sion side of services and goods of the distribution  ) h , ( P ξ θ σ ⋅ +  inherits the feedback 
effect of welfare hazard. To remove the effect the social administration must know the  
incomes of social clients, assumption N No o. .1 1. The administration accepts all eligible claims 
and revokes all not eligible claims. Once the policy ξ  takes effect all households with  
incomes σ  below ξ  claim and receives the benefits,  ξ σ < . No benefits for  ξ σ ≥  or 
the benefits being revoked even if households fall under ξ  in the past but now are above 
ξ . The tidal wave replication, hidden in income densities  ) , ( P θ σ , as well as the wave 
) h , ( P ξ θ σ ⋅ +  of adverse working incentive hidden in its undisclosed position, both 
have characteristic “tail” to the right, which is typical for the societies sharply divided into 
very rich and very poor people, F Fi ig g. .   1 1. 
3. Selection of the subsidies function. We emphasize that subsidies eligible for claims are 
paid out as benefits  ) , ( s σ ξ  in compliance with the law, assumption N No o. .2 2. The subsidy 
compensates the unfair income σ  of the poor and is a supplement to the poor to compose 
the eligible “poverty basket” for food, clothing and shelter, fuel and lights, etc., c.f. what 
Rawls [1971: 92] calls “primary goods”. 
4. Given  ) h , ( P ξ θ σ ⋅ +  evaluate the w we el lf fa ar re e   c co om mp po os si it ti io on n [] ) ( W ), ( B ξ ξ   . 
5. Notice, that by the restraint  ) ( W ) h ( a ξ ξ θ > ⋅ +  we already p po oi in nt te ed d   a at t   v vi it ta al l   i im mp po or rt ta an nc ce e 
of the proper choice of personal allowance φ -parameter,  0 > > φ ξ . Indeed, for  0 ≈ φ  we 
obtain too sterile solution,  0 ≈ min τ . In contrast, condition  ξ φ   ≈ , if the delivery constraint 








6. If possible, get hold of the principle associated with e eq qu ui it ty y   o of f   b br re ea ak kd do ow wn n. Otherwise, we 
run into the shortcomings of Nash bargaining scheme regarding the disagreement point 
() 2 1 d , d d = . Proper choice of breakdown allows to extracts the interval, or the scope of 
negotiations  [] 2 1 ξ ξ ξ ,   ∈ , internally encoded into distribution  ) h , ( P ξ θ σ ⋅ + . 
Finally, a conjecture observed true in the next example and the like. 
Under condition for equity principle of breakdown manoeuvring, the policy η  on poverty 
with equal power of negotiators minimizes the wealth amount  ) ( W ξ . 
Simulation. Example. We proceed further with a specific simulation for the welfare state 
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1 4. m = ,  9 11. = θ ,  81 6. ) m ( = Γ  and  09 0. h − = . Average income of this σ -density equals 
σ ξ θ σ σ ξ θ d ) h , ( P ) h ( a ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ = ⋅ + ∫
∞
0
,  ) m ( Γ  – extension of  ! ) m ( 1 −  to real variables. 
The subsidy  0 > − = σ ξ σ ξ ) , ( s  supplements the income of the poor up to the poverty line. 
Incorporation of more comprehensive rules of assistance is possible. 
Figure 1.   Income Distribution Density with characteristic 
”bifurcation phenomena” around the poverty line 
 
Let us verify that a disagreement policy δ might be an outcome of the game in accordance 
with the equity principle of breakdown manoeuvring. There is no reason why the equation 
High  incomes  Low 












































() ( ) ( ) 0 1 2 = ⋅ − − + ⋅ − ) ( W d d ) ( B δ δ δ φ δ , associated to the O Ob bs se er rv va at ti io on n   2 2, has a solution 
in general. However, for the particular example of the income distribution  ) h , ( P ξ θ σ ⋅ + , 
s se ee e   a ab bo ov ve e, the equation may be resolved. Indeed, using utility pairs at the endpoints of the 
bargaining interval [] 16 39 32 5 . , .    as  () () 2 1 2 1 g , u d , d d = = ,  2 1 u u < ,  1 1 u d = ,  2 2 g d = , 
2 1 g g > , where () 9 10 54 4 1 1 . g , . u = =    and () 29 1 45 29 2 2 . g , . u = =   , one can check that 
32 41. W
* =  and  % .
* 38 26 = τ , while  [] 16 39 32 5 61 4 . , . .   ∉ = δ . 
Recall already known incomes – proposals λ ,  δ (bear in mind that δ is outside the  
frontier), together with some new poverty proposals k , η  and  µ ½  as follows: 
κ   the poverty line, a policy minimizing public spending;  
minimizing the pool of tax obligations instead of the wealth-tax;  
η   the policy on poverty with equal power of negotiators;  
the social and public agencies are in symmetric positions or equal roles; 
µ ½   50% of the median income; µ  such that half of the population  
having income above µ , and half having income below that amount. 
λ   the poverty line or policy minimizing the tax rate, i.e. the best wealth-tax; 
δ  the most negative result; a) the policy of breakdown or disagreement in the political 
game or manoeuvring in welfare committee, or b) when the proposal of social  
agencies on tax-pool division was rejected by public agencies. 
After a quick glance at the table below, we are going to mirror the “eventualities of the 
burden of taxation” by the magnitude and dimension of poverty proposals ought to be   
debated or implemented. 
Table 1.  Numerical Experiment behind the Bargaining Game of  
Welfare Policy-Making and Delivery 
3 3 
Obtained by means of income  
distribution density, F Fi ig g. .   1 1;  










50% of  
median  
income 
Policy of  
disagreement, 
the breakdown 
Policy on poverty    20.05 25.45 17.36 16.76  4.61 
Poverty rate: percentage of house-
holds below the poverty line  12.79%  25.65%  8.1%  7.2%  0.06% 
Negotiating power  
of social agencies  0.28 0.5  0.2 0.19  Not defined 
Welfare level   16.48  20.62  14.35  13.86  4.54 
Public goods  7.07 6.1  7.43 7.5 1.29 
Amount of wealth  
circulating in society   38.33  37.94  38.75  38.86  41.47 
The wealth-tax,  
Marginal tax rate  20.16% 20.9%  20.05% 20.06%  3.1% 
Public spending  7.73  7.93  7.77  7.8  1.29 
Average income,  
Provision indicator  39.98 38.43 40.71 40.87  43.74 
The first day free of tax 
4 4  12. March  17. March  11. March  11. March  11. January 
                                                           
3 3 Imagine, the column in the table is a proposal laid before the welfare committee  
the member of which wishes to vote for. 








A chance behind the study to masquerade the economic reality might be an answer to the 
following question: “Is it none the less true that in the long-term horizon it is going to be  
difficult to maintain the welfare if the entire tax burden for all citizens is decreasing?” On 
the surface, it seems that at some point the fairness and equity may disappear because the 
rich simply gets richer and the poor gets poorer. The effect of “a tax relief for the rich” 
seems to drop down the welfare. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen what fallout may result 
from such eventualities. We find out that tax relief actually guarantees a fair level of welfare. 
Judgement. It goes without saying that entering the realm of obvious utopia, the table, 
nonetheless, gives a reason why the social agencies can still make a fair bargain with the 
public agencies trying to help the poor. Indeed, when engaged in interaction to implement 
equal policy 25.45 (like HE and SHE engaged the Sweet-Cake-Cutting), the government  
reviewed the demands for social services and for public goods. The equal power  = α 0.5 of 
social agencies negotiators was stronger than 0.2, see the T Ta ab bl le e   1 1. However, the incident with 
weakened power  = α 0.2 is yet to be determined and the aim of the agreement can still be 
reached on policy 17.36 for the tax rate 20.05% < 20.9%. Thus, regardless of the reduced  
liabilities of taxpayers, and even with the weakened bargaining position, the social agencies 
will be able to find a consensus with the public agencies to maintain a fair level of welfare. 
Therefore, only the policy  = λ 17.36 on poverty, F Fi ig g. .    3 3, has a chance for a vote by the  
unanimous consent. This is an example of standards as to how the State ought to behave 
when trying to fulfil its welfare mission. 
7. Concluding remarks 
It is the moment to pass in review the knowledge what the study brought to us. So far, we 
shot our loads in two directions. Into the social circle, where households of high and low  
incomes got split up into two-man economy depending on policy to decide who is living in 
poverty, to estimate the level of social costs, and thereby to reimburse the poor to treat them 
fairly. The public circle, where we revised a way of how to estimate the costs of public 
goods. Together, these estimates become functions of poverty line as a parameter. Therefore, 
the government policy on poverty, navigated through the tax system, was the choice of   
poverty line, which influenced the circulation of wealth, and for this reason, had an inverse 








Now we reveal an invisible target for the idea of feasible tax resource formation among 
households with higher incomes contra lower incomes. We determined the net income to 
serve as self-interest of households. Without the reader being fully aware of it, in so doing, 
we gave credit to the tax resource ability to guarantee reasonably high living standards for 
the poor. Later we used the guaranteed welfare as a welfare indicator. The social agencies 
took to the role of welfare delivery and were willing to put in all the efforts to increase the 
indicator. Public agencies argument, trailing a turn of the political wheel, was to meet the 
demands for public goods. Therefore, to benefit all of the society, the root of our scheme was 
the welfare formation under governmental institutions pursuing their own causes. Within the 
limits of the scheme whereas the poverty line increases, it is now a standard exercise to find 
out that the total resource, which is legally available for taxation, is shrinking in size and  
declining together with self-interests of households. This finding, a part of welfare formation 
process, leads to Laffer type ∩ -peakedness of welfare indicator and plays a major role in  
establishing a non-trivial bargaining solution on the contract curve called the bargaining   
frontier. After all, this missing detail becomes merely a pretext to the following. 
The “piece of drama” to get the reader here, was the bargaining game embedded into  
the welfare policy of institutions. In search for reasons behind the game, we provided a guide 
for how the rivalling interests of institutions as the players of the game ought to be analysed. 
Grounding on the prerogatives of the game story transformation into a normative model, we 
then embodied from the scheme a welfare masquerade of taxpayers interaction with the   
interest groups involved. As the result, we could express the consensus of the game status in 
numbers. The model explicitly introduced a bargaining power of institutions. We looked first 
due to shortcomings of the Nash scheme at the power parameter realizing that the study  
cannot provide its suitable calculus. However, we were lucky to finally find the condition, at 
least true in valuable cases, and called it “Equity of Breakdown Manoeuvring,” to fulfil the 
calculus properly. Last but not least. Despite one experiment in aiming at the simulation of 
the model does not make a trend, we presented an evidence for the claim that the well-known 
poverty line defined as 50% of the median income is a poverty proposal minimizing the 
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Proof of Observation 1. On the contrary, suppose that the government is trying to  
implement an improved welfare level  u ' u > . In other words, let the government attempts to 
implement  ) , ( u ' u τ ξ π = >  by making a policy  ξ ξ > ' . At once, for some pragmatic   
households σ  an option becomes visible to claim for subsidies to be better off because of 
inequalities  u ) , ( ' u > ≥ τ σ π . These highly pragmatic households σ  would create an  
increase  ) ( B ) ' ( B ξ ξ >  in the social costs, i.e. they would shift the balance 
) ( W x ) ( B ξ τ ξ ⋅ ⋅ =  onto deficit  ) ( W x ) ' ( B ξ τ ξ ⋅ ⋅ > . For the government, to keep the   
balance, the only option remains to adjust from τ  to  τ
ξ
ξ
ξ ξ τ >
⋅
=
) ( W x
) ' ( B
) x , , ' ( ; division x 
is not under the direct government jurisdiction, otherwise, by keeping the old policy ξ  in 
tact, the government could, but it cannot eliminate the deficit through decrease in x. If 
)) x , , ' ( , ' ( ' u ξ ξ τ ξ π >  the government must continue it’s adjustment policy of taxes 
) x , , ' ( ) x , ' , " ( ξ ξ τ ξ ξ τ > , but this time adjusting the welfare policy  ' ξ  trying to eliminate a 
new deficit  ) ' ( W x ) " ( B ξ τ ξ ⋅ ⋅ >  by the sequence  " ' ... ξ ξ <  creation. ! 
To sum up: trying an improvement  u ' u >  means making a sequence of policies  " ' ..., ξ ξ <  
unless  ' " ξ ξ = ; a policy  ' ξ  previously taken effect does not need further adjustments.  
The chain of reasoning with  u ' u <  is similar. Just follow the instructions. 
Replace:  to implement an improved by  to make a decline in 
–  better off –  worth off 
–  an improvement –  a worsening 
–  to claim for subsidies –  that the subsidies have been revoked 
–  deficit –  surplus 
–  > ≥ ,   –  < ≤ ,   
Transpose: an  increase  with  a decrease  
Proof of Observation 2. The statement is correct as soon as we can find a feasible policy 
δ for implementation of utility pair () 2 1 d , d . Really, let us replace the variable g  by  2 d  in 
the formula for constraint ( (1 1) ). Then, take out the expression for 
) ( W





=  from (1) and 
substitute it into  ... ) ( τ − 1  of constraint ( (3 3) ), where u should be replaced by  1 d  in advance. 
Simplifying we end up with the statement of the observation. ! 
Sketch of the proof, Observation 3. The proof is an add-on to the O Ob bs se er rv va at ti io on n   4 4. Indeed, 
looking at the wealth-tax values  min τ τ > , for any outcome  b S ∈ τ, g , u ... , one may prefer a 
counter outcome as a motion  τ, ' g , ' u ... , which outlines  τ, g ' g , u ' u ... < >  or 
τ, g ' g , u ' u ... > < . However, since the frontier  ) g ( u = b S  is the curve consisting of   
top-points of single ∩ -peaked preferences for the guaranteed welfare u, no one can put  
forward a motion  ° > u ' u  or  ° > g ' g  against an outcome min , g , u ... τ ° °  at  min τ τ = . We  
argue that the only way to fulfil the expectations of citizens to carry out the motion 








Below we investigate the social services and public goods feasible anticipations 
()S ∈ g , u . The bargaining agreement occurs at outcomes  τ α ξ φ , g , u , , x , p , ⇒  under 
constraint that the variation of policy ξ  does not improve the position of both negotiators at 
the same time – the point turns up on bargaining frontier  ) g ( u = b S . 
In feasible outcomes, the variables of welfare level u, the division x , policy ξ  and the tax 
rate  τ  depend on each other. The division  ° = x x , if settled as a possible agreement,   
redirects the level  ) x , ( , ( u ° = ξ τ ξ π  to become a function  ) x , ( u u ° = ξ . Consequently, the 
peak point of level u  with regard to the government policy looks like: 
  ) x , ( u ° = ° ξ ξ ξ   max    arg  (A.1) 
Observation 4. Assume that the social agencies do not shift from the division  ° = x x . Let 
the volatility constraint ( (4 4) ) solve for two different policies  2 1 ξ ξ < . Let the welfare level 
) x , ( u u ° = ξ  be a differentiable and strictly convex function of ξ  within closed interval 






















) x , ( u ξ
ξ
, 
then there exists a unique interior policy  ° ξ  maximizing u at   0 = °
∂
∂
° = ξ ξ
ξ
ξ
) x , ( u . 
Corollary. The poverty proposal ξ  higher than  ° ξ  can only decline the welfare level 
) x , ( u ° ° ξ . The proof is elementary. We say that if  ° ≤ ξ ξ , the poverty proposal ξ  for the 
division  ° x  is in the normal range, if  ° > ξ ξ  the proposal ξ  is in the prohibitive range, i.e. 
the level  ) x , ( u ° ξ  is single ∩ -peaked. 
The standpoint coming next concerns the necessary and sufficient conditions for feasible  
policy ξ  to occur at the bargaining frontier. 
Observation 5. Assume that the volatility constraint ( (4 4) ) is a differentiable of its variables. 
The welfare level  ) x , ( u u ° = ξ  is differentiable and strictly convex with respect to the policy 
ξ  within some closed interval [] 2 1 ξ ξ , . To become a point at which a feasible outcome 
  ° ° ° ° ° ⇒ ° τ α ξ φ , g , u , , x , p ,  lies on the bargaining frontier  ) g ( u = b S  it is necessary 
and sufficient that the policy  ° ξ  resolves the equation: 
 ( i)  0 = ° °
∂
∂
° = ξ ξ
ξ
ξ
) u , x , ( L , where  ) x , ( u u ° ° = ° ξ  provided that 
 ( ii)  0 ≠ ° °
∂
∂
° = u u
) u , x , ( L
u








Proof. Necessity. Let a feasible outcome    ° ° ° ° ° ⇒ ° τ α ξ φ , g , u , , x , p ,  on the bargaining 
frontier  ) g ( u = b S  maximizes ( (A A. .1 1) ) at  )) x , ( , ( u u ° ° ° = ° ξ τ ξ . Varying policy ξ  around 
° ξ  for the outcome    ° ° ° ° ° ⇒ ° τ α ξ φ , g , u , , x , p ,  and substituting  )) x , ( , ( u u ° = ξ τ ξ  into 
the constraint ( (4 4) ), we obtain an identity  0 ≡ ° ° ))) x , ( , ( , x , ( L ξ τ ξ π ξ . Within the proximity 
of  ° ° u , ξ  we exhibit for variables  u , ξ  that 
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from which we deduce the necessity statement for  ° = ξ ξ  and  ° = u u . 
Sufficiency. Suppose the condition (ii) holds. Let (i) resolves for  ° ξ  at feasible outcome 
  ° ° ° ° ° ⇒ ° τ α ξ φ , g , u , , x , p , . Combining (i) and (A.2), we conclude that 
  0 = °
∂
∂
° = ξ ξ
ξ τ ξ π
ξ
)) x , ( , ( . 
The sufficiency statement ( (A A. .1 1) ) holds since  ) x , ( u u ° = ξ  is a strictly convex function of ξ . ! 
Observation 6. In any feasible outcome within the prohibited range of poverty proposals 
ξ  social agencies can rollback to the bargaining frontier both for their own and for   
taxpayers’ advantage, i.e. the outcomes in the prohibitive range of poverty are inefficient for 
social agencies upon their coalition with taxpayers. 
Sketch of the proof. Provided that the conditions 
5 5 for the O Ob bs se er rv va at ti io on n   4 4 hold, we assume 
that public agencies propose a shift  ° > ′ = g g ) ' x , ' ( g ξ  pursuing their own causes by   
sloping along the indifference curve  ° = u ) x , ( u ξ  of welfare level  ° u . The point () x , ′ ′ ξ  
necessarily penetrates into the region of prohibited proposals. We already knew what makes 
the anticipation () ' g , ' u  feasible is the increase  ) x , ( ) x , ( ' ° ° = ° > ′ ′ = ξ τ τ ξ τ τ  of taxes that 
allows  ° > ′ g g ,    O Ob bs se er rv va at ti io on n    1 1. However, due to some self-financing effects, only in the 
prohibited range it is possible to rollback to  ) ' x , ' ( ' ) " x , " ( " ξ τ τ ξ τ τ = < = , where () " x , " ξ  
guarantees the welfare level  ' u " u >  and () " x , " ξ  occupies some point on the bargaining 
frontier  b S . Now, because of tax decrease  ' " τ τ < , the opportunities () " , " u τ  of mutual  
interests may unite the social agencies and voters-citizens against () ' , ' u τ  to “wipe-out” a 
motion () " , " u τ  to reject the proposed shift  ' g . ! 
                                                           
5 5  Actually, within the scope of weaker conditions one can disclose, see Mullat, J.E. [1979] “Stable Coalitions in 
Monotonic Games,” Automation and Remote Control 40, 1469-1478, that levels 
)) x , ( , ( ) x , ( u ° = ° ξ τ ξ π ξ  are single ∩ -peaked ξ -functions family of  ° x  parameter, 
h ht tt tp p: :/ // /w ww ww w. .d da at ta al la au un nd de er ri in ng g. .c co om m/ /d do ow wn nl lo oa ad d/ /m mo on no og ga am me e. .p pd df f. 








Figure 2. The utilities of 
the social and the public 
agencies are depicted on 
the vertical and the 
horizontal axes. The 
graph represents the 
bargaining frontier 
) g ( u = b S  of guaran-
teed welfare sloping 
down from the left-top 
ξξξξ 1 towards right-bottom 
ξξξξ 2. It is the projection 
found by resolving the 




Figure 3. As it follows 
from the graph, a motion 
for a vote reg. adequate 
amount  W=38.75 of 
wealth for the least tax 
τ =  20.05% may pass by 
unanimous consent, the 
O Ob bs se er rv va at ti io on n   3 3. In con-
trast, the higher tax   
21.32% > 20.05% may 
course a discontent that 
it might finance both: 
the higher (lower) social 
but lower (higher) public 
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The swing of the bargaining frontier projection  
    37.942      38.617    39.292     39.966      40.641  41.316     























































u(ξ 2) = 29.45 
g(ξ 2) = 1.29 
u(ξ 1) = 4.54 
g(ξ 1) = 10.9 
ξξξξ 2 = 39.16 




W(λ λ λ λ ) = 38.75 
Public goods per capita 
Amount of wealth per capita 
λ λ λ λ  = 17.36 